Rudimentary Proposition of essay:
Every sovereign state is left with choice "whether it would wish to be part of particular treaty or not" 5 . But, whether deliberately or inadvertently, the subject of withdrawal from treaty has been Membership, June 24, 1945 , Doc. 1178 pertaining to this issue ever went to International Court of Justice. Hence, selection of this topic for this essay.
Literature review:
The core issue which has been discussed under this article has been anomaly relating to withdrawal from United Nation due to lack of concrete legislation, which has been demonstrated by Egon Schwelb 11 in his work as:
" appears from the character of the treaty and from the circumstances of its conclusion or the statement of the parties that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. In the latter case, a party may denounce or withdraw from the treaty upon giving to other parties or to the depository not less than twelve months' to that effect."
The drawing of this legal distinction between a State's right to withdraw and its power to do so is not a merely academic exercise; the practical consequences become evident when considering the effects of attempted withdrawal from an international organization 14 .
With this we must gauge as to what are the implication of withdrawal and how can state effectuate it's withdrawal from this organization, if at all it possible, in next section of this essay.
STRUCTURE OF ESSAY
This section of essay deals with essence of withdrawal of nation from United Nation, inter alia, numerous gradations which are relating to this process, juxtaposing it with other treaty for comparative study, and appreciating Indonesia precedent.. 
Various Nuances attached to it:
There are numerous gradations fastened with right to withdrawal, which shall be discussed exclusively in details, hereinafter. following ideas were expressed:
Right to withdrawal vis-à-vis
 The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security.
 Even after that states feels, due to exceptional circumstances, constrained and want to leave this organization, it would not be the purpose of organization to compel that member to continue its co-operation in the organization.
 Such exceptional circumstances are:
I.
The Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do at the expense of law.
II.
Member would not be bound to remain in the Organization if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept.
III.
If an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly or in a general conference fails to secure the ratification necessary to bring such amendment into effect. Therefore the amendment has binding force upon those members who have not voted for it and it cannot withdraw because it is unable to accept this amendment.
C. The third flaw co-relate to third exception which fails to answer this question that, since charter does not specify the time period within which an amendment is to be ratified by the member states, 'when does this right comes into existence' 34 .
Hence, the statement of the commentary that "it is not the purpose Organization to compel that
Member to continue its cooperation in Organization," is incompatible with the possibilities established by above mentioned flaws.
The principle of sovereign equality 35 has been guaranteed in Charter, 1945 which became a bone of contention for some countries for entreating the right of withdrawal from United Nations.
When, on June 25, 1945, the report of Commission I embodying commentary of Committee 1/2 was presented at the Ninth Plenary Session of the Conference, the delegate of the Soviet Union dissented by declaring that:
"The opinion of the Soviet Delegation is that it is wrong to condemn beforehand the grounds on which any state might find it necessary to exercise its right of withdrawal from the Organization.
Such right is an expression of state sovereignty and should not be reviled, in advance, by the International Organization. May I cite as an example of un-conditional acknowledgment of this right of sovereign states Article 17 of the Constitution of U.S.S.R., which 33 Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, according to which amendments to the Charter shall come into force "for all Members of the United Nations" when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly or recommended by a two-thirds vote of the General Conference, and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Kelsen's argument may be undeniably true as far as the legal right of withdrawal is concerned. It would be extraordinarily difficult to interpret the Charter as giving members an unrestricted right withdraw if it is to be considered as being an international instrument of any significance and the assertion of the principle sovereign equality cannot be taken to justify such an implication 40 .
The other aspect of right to withdrawal from United Nations is that whether this right could be effectuated unilaterally by the member state or is subject to certain procedure, which ought to be followed Fitzmaurice wrote that such treaties should be assumed to be of 'indefinite duration, and only , not yet in force) [1996] 35 ILM 1439, Article XIV(1), requires a particular State to join the agreement as a condition of its entry into force and that State subsequently withdraws from the treaty, 'it can be assumed that . . . the treaty would be terminated'.ME Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2009) 694. Termination also occurs when a multilateral treaty specifies that it shall no longer be in force if denunciations reduce the parties to below a specified number. E.g. Convention on the Political Rights of Women (adopted 20 December 1952, entered into force 7 July 1954) 193 UNTS 135, Art 8(2) (providing that the convention 'shall cease to be in force as from the date when the denunciation which reduces the number of Parties to less than six becomes effective'). However, the default rule in VCLT Art 55 allows the treaty to continue in force unless it specifies a minimum number of required parties. Customary International Law provides for the exception to the rule of pacta sunt servanda which is application of clausula rebus sic stantibus. The meaning of the clausula is supposed to be only that "a vital change of circumstances may be of such kind as to justify a party in demanding to be released from the obligations of an unnotifiable treaty. 55 " "Vital change of circumstances" means that the obligations stipulated in the treaty imperil the existence of the party which demands to release. When a state is of the opinion that a vital change of circumstances has occurred, it must first request the other party or parties to abrogate the treaty. If such abrogation, together with the suggestion to submit the case to an international court, is refused, the state may declare itself to be longer bound by the treaty 56 . of international law 76 , other than treaty and customary international law, as they are hardly of any use, due to their absence in concretizing this issue or subject.
It could also be inferred that through juxtaposition, the width and the horizon of our observation has been magnified, as it lend to us some sort of concretization, even if it relates to state practice only. Also Indonesia precedent paves the way for future course of action on member states of the organization, as to right of withdrawal.
It can finally be reiterated and inferred that as a general rule, a member state shall not be allowed to leave its obligation set out under the charter of the United Nation, 1945 as leaving obligation under United Nation Charter, 1945 is made virtually not possible and it also authenticate the intent of drafters of this charter. But if their exists certain exceptional circumstances then this rigidity could be relaxed and rights could be invoked, as it is not within the comity of nations to force reluctant member to comply with its obligation even during the time of hardship due to fundamental changes in circumstances. But those rights may not be unilaterally invoked rather through proper procedure as conveyed through this essay. 76 Article 38 of Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945 (sources of international law).
